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CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*
I. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY OF THE "HAVES" IN LITIGATION
Marc Galanter's essay, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change' (Why the "Haves" Come out
Ahead), published twenty-five years ago, set an important agenda for those
who care about the distributive effects of legal processes, including those of
us who have been engaged in jurisprudential, intellectual, and empirical
debates about the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative and
conventional legal procedures. As a document of legal intellectual history,
this Article was formed in the crucible of the Legal Mobilization and
Modernization program at Yale Law School that spawned so many "law
and . . . " studies, including legal pluralism, law and society, critical legal
studies, and in its own way, even law and economics studies. A seminal
work in the socio-legal studies canon, Galanter's article demonstrates the
complex patterns of how law and legal institutions actually work, beyond
descriptions of legal doctrines and assumed efficacy and "penetration" of
law. In some senses, it is a continuation of legal realism, reminding us of
the importance of studying the legal institutions in which the law is
embedded and suggesting, at its end, how we might reform or "adjust"
those institutions to produce optimal social change (in this case,
redistribution of resources and delivery of justice).
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Chair, Georgetown-CPR
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR; A.B., Barnard College, Columbia
University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.D. (Hon.), Quinnipiac College of
Law. This Paper was originally given at a conference commemorating the 25th
anniversary of the publication of Marc Galanter's Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974), at the
University of Wisconsin Law School, May 1-2, 1998. I thank William Woodward for
comments and Meredith Weinberg for research assistance. I shared a panel with
Richard Speidel on mandatory arbitration at a symposium, Courts on Trial, held at the
University of Arizona in April of 1998, at which some of these remarks were also
presented. See generally Symposium, Courts on Tial, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 717 (1998);
see also Richard Speidel, Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its
Welcome, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 1069 (1998).
1 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
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Yet, it is also, though Marc Galanter would probably not identify it as
such, one of the significant pieces of work associated with critical legal
studies, for it provides the theoretical analysis for operationalization and
empirical testing of the proposition that "the basic architecture of the legal
system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a means of
redistributive (that is, systemically equalizing) change."2 In this, the piece
recognizes the limits of law, legal institutions, and perhaps of rights
strategies, so essential to much of the critical scholarship on the legal
system written in the 1970s and 1980s.
In this landscape-shaping work, Galanter reminds us that legal
institutions and social change are structurally marked. The components of
the legal system, parties, lawyers, institutions, rules, and "alternatives to
the official system," in their social, economic, and political variations and
interactions, shape the outputs of courts, litigation, and disputes. Galanter
criticizes the political dysfunction of a system that allows certain
advantaged participants (the "repeat players") to maximize their long-term
gains over those "one-shotters" who may seek justice, but participate with
fewer resources. Galanter thus uses a sociology of law to uncover the
"myths" or fictions of a faith in law, doctrine, and legal institutions that
appear to promote "equal justice" but, in reality, deliver power instead.3
Law, embedded in society, produces not universalistic truths but variable
outcomes that are effected by the endowments of the players who are, in
turn, embedded in social structures that shape and transcend what law itself
can do.
The intellectual problem that Galanter set for himself was to consider,
sociologically, "under what conditions can litigation be redistributive?," 4
implicitly assuming, of course, that redistribution (or equalization efforts)
in the system are normatively desirable. Within the frame of a social
scientific perspective, Galanter began his piece with a series of
propositions-hypotheses about how the constituent elements of a legal
system produce outputs (rules, adjudications, and enforcements) that may
be less than optimal for those seeking such normatively desirable ends (of
redistribution). 5
2 Id. at 95.
3 For a useful reframing of the tensions in socio-legal studies between justice and
power, see generally JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES (Bryant Garth &
Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
4 Galanter, supra note 1, at 95.
5 That the article was rejected by many conventional law reviews and is now one
of the most cited pieces of legal scholarship )demonstrates how resistant legal scholars
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Aside from Galanter's many astute observations about the patterning of
the legal system and its players, his article is prescient in its
acknowledgment of "court-like agencies" and "alternatives to the official
system" 6 that will comprise this Article's basic concern-why the "Haves"
are still coming out ahead in current alternatives to the official systems of
adjudication.
The continued relevance of Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead in a time
of somewhat diminished interest in litigation7 is evidenced by Galanter's
own recognition that not all cases would make it to high-level or "peak"
institutions.8 Thus, even twenty-five years ago, Galanter recognized that
much law would be made, developed, and enforced either in "field level"
agencies or in "alternatives to official systems" such as those which were
"appended" to formal institutions (e.g., routine case processing, plea
bargaining, court-oriented settlement, and even negotiation between the
parties) or those which were "private remedy systems" (religious courts,
arbitration tribunals, institutional grievance mechanisms, ombuds,
mediation, conciliation, trade associations, unions, complaint bureaus, and
even public opinion).9
While the bulk of Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead is devoted to
resource mobilization and advantage of certain parties in litigation, the end
of the piece traces the effects of "Haves" advantage in these less official
and law schools were to the idea that law and legal institutions are themselves
sociologically variable. In an era when both the "right" and the "left" had something
of an overblown faith in law and legal institutions, the notion that law might not be the
preeminent discipline and explanatory force was difficult to accept. Query: why have
law and economics, and now law and humanities, found such greater acceptance as
alternative methodological approaches to the evaluation of whether law does its job well
(in terms of efficiency and justice)?
6 Galanter, supra note 1, at 96, 124.
7 Whether there is in fact more or less litigation either over time, in the federal or
state systems in the United States, or in the United States compared to other legal
regimes, is another of the major socio-legal questions to which Marc Galanter has
devoted much effort. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary
Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 717 (1998); Marc Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4
(1983); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3
(1986); Marc Galanter, Planet of the Aps: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8 Galanter, supra note 1, at 96-97.
9 Id. at 97, 124, 126, 128.
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arenas 10 and thus, is most timely for revisiting in this era of increased use
of "alternatives to official systems," or as it is currently termed,
"alternative dispute resolution" (ADR). In this section of his article,
Galanter accurately notes that what processes parties might use for their
disputes, conflicts, and transactions would depend on the "'density' of
the[ir] relationships"-that is, how often they interacted with each other. 11
He predicted that parties who often interact with each other (repeat players
with repeat players) would be less likely to use the official litigation system
and would be more likely to employ the less official systems of private
remedies.12 Thus, it is particularly useful for us now to look at how repeat
players and one-shotters are faring in environments of increased use of less
"official" dispute resolution systems.
I begin by refraining slightly and by making somewhat more complex
the normative question. If Galanter was concerned with the question of
under what conditions redistribution (social change and equalization) could
be effectuated in litigation, 13 I begin with the question of under what
conditions and in which processes justice can be achieved. Is redistribution
the same as justice? How should we measure either justice or
redistribution-from the perspective of aggregative, external views or from
the point of view of the parties internal to the dispute, conflict, or
transaction?14
When I began my own critiques of the litigation system and the
"appended" negotiation processes that occurred within its shadow some
fifteen years ago, 15 it was precisely because, from a different perspective, I
theorized that litigation was sometimes inadequate for the task of solving
both structural and distributive problems, as well as more individual ones. 16
10 See id. at 124-35.
11 1d. at 130.
12 See id. at 130.
13 See id. at 95-96.
141 have explored this question in Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83
GEo. L.J. 2663 (1995). Cf. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 2647 (1995). Marc Galanter is well aware of both the
normative and the measurement problems posed here. See Marc Galanter, Compared to
What? Assessing the Quality of Dispute Processing, 66 DENv. U. L. REv. xi, xiv
(1989).
15 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rnv. 754 (1984).
16 See id. at 794-95.
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To the extent that certain structural aspects of litigation, also commented on
by Galanter, tended to create binary win or lose results, that enforcement
was often weak, that individualization of cases was inadequate to monitor
larger social problems, and that even "wins" were often modified quickly
in actual practice, 17 I argued that other conceptual approaches to legal
problem solving, outside of litigation, were often, if not always, more
appropriate.18
Underlying needs and interests of parties and larger constituencies such
as communities, employees, and governments might perhaps better be
addressed in other fora-with different conceptions of dyadic negotiations,
mediation, public policy fora, 19 and the more multifaceted use of processes
that we now call "appropriate dispute resolution," not alternative dispute
resolution. There is a vigorous debate about the use of these words and the
ideologies which they attempt to express, 20 which I will not address fully
here. To the extent that negotiation, mediation, arbitration, settlement, and
other forms of dispute processing represent most of Galanter's iceberg 2'
and Hart and Sack's pyramid22 of the disputing in our society, some of us
have urged that we stop using "alternative" where full scale adjudication in
a court is now more the alternative than the norm. 23 The term
"appropriate" signals that one role of a legal system is to provide a variety
of choices about how best to handle particular issues, problems, disputes,
conflicts, and transactions-now called a menu, a "multi-door courthouse,"
17 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 137-39.
18 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 794.
19 See generally CONSENSUS BUILDING INsTITuTE, THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (describing alternative processes for
the resolution or management of a wide variety of legal, political, allocative,
community, and environmental issues).
20 See, e.g., Eileen Barkas Hoffman, The Impact of the ADR Act of 1998, TRIAL,
June 1999, at 30, 30.
21 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 144.
22 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPiCATION OF LAw 158-68 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
23 See LEONARD RisiN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 51 (2d ed. 1997); Albie Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the
Old-Fashioned Way- We Earn It, 4 NEGOTITION J. 55, 62 (1988); Leonard Riskin &
James E. Westbrook, Integrating Dispute Resolution into Standard First Year Courses:
The Missouri Plan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509, 509 (1989).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
or "variet[ies]" of "dispute processing. "24 On the other hand, opponents of
the use of "alternatives" to court, as a critique of increased privatization of
disputing (also noted presciently by Galanter in 197425), do not want such
processes labeled as "appropriate" at all. 2 6
At the same time that I and others were making this qualitative
argument for moving some disputes outside of litigation, 27 debates about
whether the litigation system was in fact overloaded caused many court
24 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 111, 111-13 (1976). Some have argued that
parties' choices about what kind of dispute processes to use are more appropriately left
to consensual contracting. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract
and Other Possibilities, 13 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 303, 340 (1998). Others find
that contracting for "alternatives" to court is especially problematic because of the
advantage taken by repeat players in contracting over single-shot contractors. See, e.g.,
Paul Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 266 (1998).
25 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 124-35.
26 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 14, at 2637; see also Owen Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); Bryant Garth, Privatization and the New
Market for Disputes: A Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12
STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 367, 368 (1992); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing
Doors?: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 01O ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 211, 261-65 (1995).
27 See, e.g., Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee
on the Operation of the Jury System, in 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984); see also ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROGER FISHER Er AL., GETTING
TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed.
1991); DAVID LAx & JAMES SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETrIVE GAIN (1986); HOWARD RAiFFA, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUICSHANK,
BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES
(1987); Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective
Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 270 (1982);
Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982);
Joan B. Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents' Perception of Their
Processes and Outcomes, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1989, at 71; Leonard L. Riskin,
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982); Mary P. Rowe, The Non-Union
Complaint System at M.LT.: An Upward-Feedback, Mediation Model, 2 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COSTS LrrIG., Apr. 1984, at 10; Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The
Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 461 (1986).
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personnel, including Supreme Court Justices28 and court administrators, 29
to seek diversionary programs away from full scale adjudication to reduce
case loads in the courts. While some argued a version of "[w]hy the
'Haves' come out ahead" by suggesting that the least powerful were being
forced into systems of second class justice in neighborhood justice center
mediation30 just as they were achieving more legal rights "on the books,"
others pointed out that it was the "Haves" who were in fact exiting the
system by first choosing more streamlined and controlled forms of private
justice when they disputed with each other,31 and now when they impose
mandatory private dispute resolution on their employees, clients,
customers, patients, franchisees, and licensees. 32 To put it simply, the
28 See, e.g., Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?: Annual Report on the
State of the Judiciary, Remarks at the Mid-Year Meeting of the American Bar
Association (Jan. 24, 1982), in 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
29 For a thoughtful and qualitative assessment of ADR efforts in the courts, see
generally Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs:
Why They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten
Important Values, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 303. C. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of
ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1991) (arguing that the positive and
qualitative advantages of ADR were becoming co-opted by increased use within the
adversarial litigation system).
30 See, e.g., Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice is in the
Halls, in 1 THE PoLITIcs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 119, 120
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); see also CmusnNE HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE 105-
06 (1985).
31 The Center for Public Resources (CPR) was founded in 1979 and is comprised
of the Fortune 500 companies' lawyers, both general counsel and major law firm
lawyers, to explore more effective and efficient forms of disputing, using, among other
methods, private mini-trials, public summary jury trials, mediation, arbitration,
evaluation, and other forms of ADR. See CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution Homepage (last modified Nov. 10, 1999)
<http://www.cpradr.org/>. To date there are more than seven thousand corporations
and their subsidiaries who have signed a CPR pledge to explore various forms of ADR
with each other. Others have criticized the extensive use of private "rent-a-judges" in
California (and now nationwide with JAMS-Endispute) by those who can afford to exit
the system and pay for their own justice systems. See, e.g., Robert Gnaizda, Rent-a-
Judge: Secret Justice for the Privileged Few, 66 JUDICATuRE 6, 11 (1982); Richard
Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 53, 55.
32 See Mark Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
267, 272 (1995); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,
1996 Sup. CT. REv. 331, 332-33; Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to
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"Haves" come out ahead by being able to choose and manipulate what
process will be used to enforce substantive rights.
Thus, with the increased use of "alternatives to official systems" 33 (to
use Galanter's terms) at both ends of the economic and political spectrum,
the question of whether power recapitulates itself in all forms of dispute
systems is clearly ripe. In this Article, I will explore theoretically and
address empirically (by reporting on the little but evocative currently
available data) the question of whether the "Haves" come out ahead in
ADR too, as they do in the more official arena of litigation.
II. THE ARGUMENT AND SOME TERMS OF DEFINITION
Marc Galanter's basic argument in Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead
was that certain classes of litigants (repeat players) are more able to
mobilize legal and other resources to maximize long-term gain in litigation
(formal adjudication of disputes in courts). 34 Galanter began by
decomposing the constituent elements of litigation into parties (divided into
repeat players or one-shotters), lawyers, institutions (different layers of
courts and court-like agencies), and rules and alternatives. 35 He then
theorized that, in most cases, repeat players could use the litigation system
to their advantage and, to successfully repel serious efforts to use the courts
for legal rule change, to achieve power and economic equalization or social
redistributive effects. 36 With many cases in the system, repeat players have
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1345 (1997); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, California Court Limits Mandatory Arbitration, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COSTS LIG. 109, 121 (1997); David Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect
Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 WIs. L. REv. 33, 37; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
637, 637 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?]; Jean R.
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1997); Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine
Print: "You Can't Sue Us," Arbitration Clauses Block Consumers from Taking
Companies to Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at A-i; Barry Meier, In Fine Print,
Customers Lose Ability to Sue: Arbitrators, Not Courts, Rule on Complaints, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 10, 1997, at Al.
33 Galanter, supra note 1, at 124.
34 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 98-103.
35 See id. at 97-135.
36 See id. at 103-04.
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low stakes in any one case and thus can maximize long-term gain by
resisting settlements, developing advance intelligence, and being able to
plan for future engagement. Further, repeat players can cultivate a
"bargaining or litigation reputation" to accomplish particular goals or
simply to develop trust and legitimacy 37 with court personnel, developing
long-term relationships with institutional incumbents, by participating
actively in procedural as well as substantive rule construction and
adoption. 38 Thus, winning any one case may not matter as much as being a
player in the system who can manipulate rules, decisionmakers, and court
personnel to deliver, over the long-term, optimal and reliable outcomes.
Lawyers, as representatives of some repeat players, likewise develop
substantive expertise; their knowledge of institutional incumbents, 39 reliable
business-getting strategies, and reputations allow them to serve as brokers
or gatekeepers to the larger system.
Institutions, such as overloaded courts, also serve to advantage repeat
players because, with the deflection of cases away from full scale litigation,
currently existing rules will be less likely to be challenged and knowledge
of the system will add to the bargaining endowments that occur in the
shadow of the law and courts.4° With large case loads and great delay,
Galanter posited, powerful repeat players (especially when defending
against plaintiffs seeking rule changes) will benefit from a lack of rulings
and the inability of one-shotters to enforce or monitor rule changes.
41
Possessors (landlords, creditors, and employers) will be more likely to be
able to hold on to what they have when the system works slowly. In an
ironic twist, Galanter suggested that the more process there is (remember,
this was written at the time of the procedural due process revolution), the
more delay and status quo protection there will be for the "possessors" (the
37 The repeat player role of the Solicitor General of the United States in Supreme
Court litigation is one example here. See the recent controversial report of the role of
the Solicitor General in some hotly contested cases in EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS 230-34 (1998).
38 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 100-01, 123-24.
39 For a demonstration of what Felstiner and Sarat have described as lawyers who
are valued not for what they know but who they know, see AuST=n SARAT & WILLIAM
L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEm CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN
THE LEGAL PROCESS 90-91 (1995) and Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Law and
Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 L. & Soc'Y REv. 93, 99-116 (1986).
40 See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 985, 990 (1979).
41 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 121-24.
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"Haves"). 42 Given the expense of mobilizing lawyers who know and can
use the system and its rules, the one-shot litigant, especially one who seeks
to challenge the status quo, will often, but not always, 43 be overwhelmed
and unsuccessful. Thus, rule change for the one-shot "Have-not" will be
expensive, incremental, and largely symbolic. 44 In Galanter's words,
"[1]itigation then is unlikely to shape decisively the distribution of power in
society. " 45
In the final portion of his paper, Galanter urged social structural
changes so that litigation could be made more effective; thus, he did not
abandon litigation as a site of social change activity. He sought instead to
offer reforms to alter power relations between the parties. 46 He suggested
that one-shotters need to become more like repeat players. For this he
offered a variety of suggestions which have been utilized in the last twenty-
five years, particularly by those who seek social change through law.47
Class actions and aggregations of claimants can make some one-shotters
more like repeat players, as can organizational client groups and
organizational litigation strategies (like those of the NAACP, Inc. Fund)
which also focus on long-term gain, perhaps sometimes sacrificing an
42 See id. at 124.
43 Galanter recognizes that some "Have-nots" sometimes can be repeat players
too-for instance, multiple criminal offenders and repeat debtors. See id. at 103.
Additionally, one-shotters sometimes can benefit from the status quo. Due process
hearings before welfare termination, for example, make some one-shotters
"possessors," if only temporarily. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970)
("The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as
well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination
evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end."). Due process and delay sometimes
do protect "Have-not" possessors, like tenants who cannot be evicted without some
process. For a thoughtful description of how repeat players were able to manipulate
even due process protections, see Lazerson, supra note 30, at 119-22.
44 Galanter's critique of the symbolic, rather than tangible, nature of successful
rule changes in the litigation system is close to my own. When I was a legal services
lawyer and a repeat player in the litigation system of institutional rule change, we
would often "win" institutional lawsuits to gain rule change of welfare regulation,
employment practices, and prison practices, only to have the actors adapt by changing
behaviors back or quickly modifying rules and regulations. See Galanter, supra note 1,
at 149-50.
45 Id. at 150.
46 See id. at 135-44.
47 See id.
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individual case.48 Use of repeat player lawyers (such as legal services
lawyers and other public interest or cause lawyers committed to particular
social change objectives and not just to professional roles) to bring well-
planned and strategized test cases are all ways of converting one-shotters
into repeat players in the system. To the extent that such strategies were
successful, 49 Galanter reminded us of the resistance to such equalization of
power. In defense of then Governor Ronald Reagan's veto of the California
Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) program, the head of the California Office
of Economic Opportunity's legal services program said, "[w]hat we created
in CRLA is an economic leverage equal to that of a large corporation.
Clearly that should not be." 50 Such lawyer leverage was successful in both
substantive and procedural rule changes, notably, for example, with respect
to attorneys fees statutes and the "due process revolution," as well as in
consumer rights, civil rights, and employment discrimination cases.
On the other hand, Galanter's focus on changing the social structure of
litigation to maximize its effects for rule change was missing one very
48 See LAZARUs, supra note 37, at 170-217, for a description of how the choice of
the McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315-18 (1987), capital punishment case was not
optimal for the empirical attack on the racism of the administration of the death penalty.
49 There is some debate in the literature on social movement and cause lawyers
about how effective these strategies have been. See generally NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND
JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989); JOEL
HANDLER FT AL., LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978); John Kilwein,
Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
REsPoNsEBiLrriEs 181 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 1998); PUBLic
INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Burton A. Wesbrod et
al. eds., 1978); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITcS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
PoLIcy, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974); Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal
Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REv. 474 (1985); Ruth Buchanan &
Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at
Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 687 (1992); Ingrid V.
Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4
CLINICAL L. REv. 433 (1998); Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the
Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529 (1995); Robert G. Meadow & Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Personalized or Bureaucratized Justice in Legal Services: Resolving Sociological
Ambivalence in the Delivery of Legal Aid for the Poor, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 397
(1985); Ann Southworth, Business Planning for the Destitute? Lawyers as Facilitators
in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1121; Symposium, Political
Lawyering: Conversations on Progressive Social Change, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 285 (1996).
50 Galanter, supra note 1, at 144, 151 n.144.
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important component-one which became strikingly real in the years that
followed publication-politics. By calling for increased mobilization of
legal resources to turn one-shotters into repeat players, Galanter assumed
that courts and official decisionmakers would be responsive to substantive
equalization goals. This has proved to be less than true, even with all of the
successful public interest and other class mobilization of repeat, but "Have-
not," claimants. 51 That litigation is less successful for social change
ultimately may be more dependent on conventional party and judicial
politics than social structure. To the extent that the more liberal judges of
the 1960s and 1970s were replaced, at least in the federal judiciary, by
increasingly conservative judges and justices, redistributive and
equalization results from courts became less and less likely, even with all
the repeat play advantages that could be mobilized. Thus, while litigation
continued, social change advocates returned to political processes including
lobbying, legislative advocacy, and grassroots activities. 52 To the extent
that Galanter's repeat player advice has worked for "Have-nots," it has
been most successfully deployed by personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers who,
in some cases, have moved rapidly from trying difficult-to-prove cases to
maintaining hugely successful mass tort practices. This has converted the
lawyers, if not the clients, into very successful repeat players. 53
Galanter's analysis also suggested that as interaction increases between
repeat players themselves, there will be increased privatization,
decentralization, and legal pluralism, and less public norm enforcement. 54
In this he was prescient as well, because so many repeat player interactions,
even predispute, have been converted to more informal, bilateral forms of
dispute resolution in the pluralistic, particularistic, and decentralized forms
of ADR that are so common now (such as exclusive internal organizational
51 For modem examples of "impact" studies that have demonstrated the less than
perfect success of organized litigation strategies, see generally GERALD ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) and RICHARD
SOBEL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
52 See generally Kilwein, supra note 49; GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Peter
Edelman, Public Interest Lawyering (1998) (unpublished materials, on file with
author); Michael Wald, Legal Strategies for Social Change (spring 1996) (unpublished
materials, on file with author).
53 See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL 9-10 (1985); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED YEAR
CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILLIP
MORRIS 639-77 (1996).
54 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 110-14.
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arbitration programs). It is to the issues of repeat players and the "Haves"
and "Have-nots" in the increasing use of ADR to which I now turn.
For all of his foresight, the one part of dispute resolution that Galanter
did not wholly predict was the differential social structure of "alternatives
to the official system." Although his description of the iceberg of disputing
was less continuous with the official system of adjudication than the 1950s
structuralist-functionalist pyramid of Hart and Sacks, positing both
appended and private remedial schemes, 55 what we are faced with now in
the "landscape of disputing" are highly privatized forms of disputing (form
or adhesion contracts in consumer, health, employment, securities,
banking, and education requiring compulsory arbitration) that are strongly
supported by the formal justice system. 56 To the extent that Supreme Court
jurisprudence over the last ten years increasingly has sustained mandatory
arbitration provisions in private contracts, 57 some have argued that the state
has, in effect, privatized the dispute resolution system, providing an odd
relationship between the public and private dimensions of, the legal
system. 58 In addition, increased use of various forms of ADR within the
courts has increased the use of "appended, but also private" forms of
dispute resolution within the official justice system, raising some serious
questions about whether such programs are public or private and what rules
of procedure, ethics, and substance should be applied in such hybrid
settings. 59 Thus, with increased use of both public and private dispute
55 Compare Galanter, supra note 1, at 134 n.97, 144 with HART & SACKS, supra
note 22, at 158-68.
56 See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 471 (declaring that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (1994), codifies a federal policy in favor of arbitration).
57 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 33, 35
(1991) (holding that a securities broker's statutory age discrimination claim was subject
to mandatory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement set forth in his securities
registration application).
58 See Reuben, supra note 31, at 55-57. Richard C. Reuben has gone so far as to
suggest that Supreme Court and lower court approval of private dispute resolution
agreements amount to state action and should subject even private ADR to the
requirements of due process. See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State
Action Theory of ADR, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 615-19 (1997).
59 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution:
New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyer's Responsibilities,
38 S. TEx. L. REv. 407, 412-13 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in
Alternative Dispute Resolution]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR
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resolution processes, and with increased public imprimaturs applied to
private disputing forms, the question of whether the "Haves" come out
ahead in ADR is manifest. Further, the question of what is private and what
is public about disputing has become quite blurred, with both legal and
social justice consequences that remain murky.
Recent efforts to consider fairness, justice, and redistributive standards
in ADR have attempted to confront questions regarding who are repeat
players in ADR and what difference repeat playing makes for the
individuals involved, as well as for the larger justice system. 60
Note the many ways in which there may be repeat players in the use of
alternative justice systems. The corporation, employer, health care
provider, bank, educational institution, securities broker, or other repeat
play institution using a clause in a form contract61 to provide or offer
services 62 and requiring as a condition of service, employment, or sale of
product that the customer, consumer, employee, or client submit to
Representation: A Roadmap of Critical Issues, DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 3,
3.
60 1 am currently chairing the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and
Standards in ADR, which is preparing position papers, drafting ethical rules, and
collecting best practices on issues involving uses of ADR. These efforts require
consideration of such issues as individual third party neutral roles, client-consumer
roles, representative roles in ADR, and issues surrounding providers (public and
private) of ADR services; all of these individuals and groups are potential repeat
players in the alternative justice system. See PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER
ORGANIZATIONS Principle V cmt. & n. 19 (Working Group on ADR Provider
Organizations, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR,
Tentative Draft 1999) (on file with author); TAXONOMY OF ADR PROVIDER
ORGANIZATIONS (Working Group on ADR Provider Organizations, CPR-Georgetown
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Tentative Draft 1998) (on file with
author).
61 This is often called "ex ante" dispute resolution. Steven Shavell, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1995).
62 In the most extreme example yet, employees have been held to mandatory
arbitration clauses that appeared in the employment application, but not in any
employment contract or personnel manual delineating the terms of the employment
relation, for instance in Form U-4, which is utilized in the securities industry. See,
e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 25; Palmer-Scopetta v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 F.
Supp. 2d 1364, 1366-68 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Hart v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 395, 398-99, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Thomas v. Bear,
Sterns & Co., No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-1970D, 1998 WL 684232, at *2-*3 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 25, 1998); Carrington & Haagen, supra note 32, at 369. Almost as surprising is
the enforcement of a similar clause in a changed employee manual, 26 years after initial
employment. See Estreicher, supra note 32, at 1347 n. 11.
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mandatory arbitration or other dispute resolution63 is a repeat player, in
choice of forum64 as well as form, with implications for choice of law,
convenience, cost, and stake in litigation. These clauses often eliminate
choices with respect to decisionmaker, rules of evidence, and procedure or
substantive law65 to be applied. They also set limits on appeals, define the
standard of review to be applied if there is an appeal, 66 and determine
whether or not there will even be a written decision elaborating the reasons
or basis for a decision (in arbitration). 67
To the extent that ADR systems designers 68 are hired specifically to
institutionalize forms of disputing in labor relations, corporations,
hospitals, government agencies, universities, and the like, individuals
63 Some contracts might provide for mediation and some for particular providers,
like the one I was asked to sign in leasing my home, which required use of JAMS-
Endispute to arbitrate any and all claims arising out of the lease agreement. I crossed
out the clause. See generally Meier, supra note 32, at Al.
64 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991), superseded
by Vessel Owners Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 102-587, § 3006, 106 Stat. 5039, 5068
(1992) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1994)). The 102d Congress
amended the Vessel Owners Liability Act after Carnival was decided; it now allows a
claimant to bring suit in "any [instead of "a"] court of competent jurisdiction...."
The legislative history demonstrates that the Act was fully intended to overturn
Carnival because part of the Court's reasoning was that the forum selection clause was
acceptable because it did not "take away [plaintiffs'] right to trial by 'a trial by [a]
court of competent jurisdiction'...." Carnival, 499 U.S. at 596 (quoting 46 U.S.C.
app. § 183c (1988) (amended 1992)). It just limited plaintiff to litigation in a Florida
court. See 138 CONG. REc. H11785 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Studds)
(providing that the amendment was necessary because the Supreme Court's ruling in
Carnival "allowed a cruise line to enforce a forum selection clause"). This amendment
to the statute overruling Carnival may aid one-shotters, but only one-shotters on cruise
ships. See Yang v. M/V Minas Leo, No. 94-15168, 1996 WL 32161, at *1 (9th Cir.
Jan. 26, 1996) (stating that the amendment to the Vessel Owners Liability Act
"discounts forum-selection clauses only in the passenger context").
65 See Stephen Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 725 (1999); William J. Woodward Jr.,
Changes in the UCC: Where in the World Will Your Contract Be Governed By?, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 12, 1999, at 7.
66 See Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-In" for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 263, 265 (1997).
67 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
68 See generally CATHY CoNsTANTINo & CHRISTINA MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CoNFLucT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY
ORGANIZATIONS (1996); WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DIsPurEs RESOLVED:
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988).
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contracting with large organizations will have virtually no ability to choose,
let alone to mobilize legal or other resources needed to defend, as well as
claim, in certain contexts. The obvious placement of such cases in
Galanter's Type II or III (RP (repeat player) vs. OS (one-shotter) or OS vs.
RP) of types of disputes 69 makes clear the various advantages that will flow
to the repeat player who controls virtually all aspects of the disputing
process.
Even in mid-dispute or post-dispute7° use of ADR, some of the same
effects may occur. Repeat players such as large corporations, who expect
repetitive litigation, may not be able to contract in advance for a particular
form of dispute resolution in all cases, but once a case is ripe or is filed,
they may be able to control some aspects of the disputing process. For
example, one large law firm which specializes in employment cases uses
the same ADR firm repeatedly to mediate its cases when it is able to
persuade employment claimants to use "voluntary" mediation. 71 Thus,
69 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 108-09.
70 Though some have labeled this "ex post" use of ADR because ADR may be
chosen (or mandated, as in court ADR programs) after the dispute has ripened, it is
probably more accurate to describe this as use of ADR during, not after, the dispute.
71 Beyond the use of one ADR firm as a repeat provider, this law firm represented
to me that a single mediator had been used over 300 times in one year! The repeat play
law firm (by specialty) was able to maximize its use of a single repeat play mediator.
So far, neither ethics regulations nor other rules require the law firm or the mediator to
disclose to one-shot litigants that he had performed for this firm before. Cf. MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.5.3(b)(1) (CPR-Georgetown Commission on
Ethics and Standards in ADR, Proposed Draft 1999), reprinted in Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Professionalism and Ethics in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1999) (providing that "[a] lawyer who serves as a third party
neutral should ... [d]isclose to the parties all circumstances, reasonably known to the
lawyer, why the lawyer might not be perceived to be impartial," including, among
other things, "any existing or past financial, business, professional, family or social
relationship with any of the parties, including, but not limited to any prior
representation of any of the parties, their counsel and witnesses, or service as an ADR
neutral for any of the parties .... "). On the other hand, to the extent that employment
claimants often use the same or a limited number of specialized lawyers, there may be
some knowledge or "consent" to the use of an ADR provider who is effective by the
repeat play plaintiff's lawyer. Those most in danger of being taken advantage of are
one-shot claimants with one-shot or "new to the territory" lawyers. The disclosure
rules (of past or repeat play work of the third party neutral) for arbitration are clearer
and more codified, both in state regulatory schemes and in the private rules of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA). See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROFESSIONS CODE
§ 7085.5(c) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); see also COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Rule 19
(American Arbitration Ass'n 1999).
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some disputants may be repeat players in the use and choice of particular
third party neutrals, who may, in turn, have repeat play expertise, either in
substance or with respect to the parties (mediators, arbitrators, private
judges, or evaluators) or particular processes (some repeat players prefer
the finality of decisions in arbitration and others prefer the flexibility of
mediation). 72 In some cases, as in labor-management arbitrations, where
collective bargaining has institutionalized the selection processes to include
partisan arbitrators in repeat play labor contract grievances, the disputes
may fall more fairly into Box IV of Galanter's taxonomy (RP vs. RP).73
Third party neutrals may themselves become repeat players, either
through specification in predispute contracts or assignment to court rosters,
or by developing specialized expertise. It is common in some areas of law,
for example, for the parties to seek "wise elders" 74 who understand the
substance of the dispute or the community in which it is embedded, such as
in intellectual property cases.75 Lawsuits already have (thus far
unsuccessfully) challenged the bias of presumed repeat players who are
thought to represent the repeat player interest of securities brokers or the
securities industry 76 or who are too homogeneous demographically and not
72 See Jeffrey Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11
OHIO ST. J. oN Disp. REsOL. 297, 340-44 (1996) (distinguishing between decision-
seeking ADR-like arbitration and settlement-seeking ADR-like mediation).
73 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 110-13.
74 Martin Shapiro describes the third party neutral as a wise elder or "the big
man," enmeshed in the dispute and sought out precisely because he ii a repeat player
who knows the community, the disputants, and the likely remedies. MARTIN SHAPIRO,
CouRTs: A COMPARAVE AND PoimcAL ANALYsIs 6 (1981).
75 This, in turn, presents great opportunities for conflicts of interests. See N.D.
CAL. Loc. R. ADR 2-5(d) (regarding conflicts of interests for third party neutrals);
Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D. Utah 1995).
76 See Olson v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 876 F. Supp. 850, 851 (N.D. Tex.
1995); see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F.
Supp. 190, 212 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd in part, 170 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (reversing
district court's refusal to compel arbitration on the grounds of "structural bias" in the
New York Stock Exchange arbitral forum, but affirming order to deny motion for
arbitration because the arbitration agreement at issue did not meet the standards of the
1991 Civil Rights Act amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)
(Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution), for enforcing arbitration clauses). The
amendments to Title VII discussed in Rosenberg encourage arbitration "where
appropriate," id., and the First Circuit found arbitration inappropriate here because
there was not even a "minimal level of notice to [Rosenberg] that statutory claims are
subject to arbitration." Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 21. Interestingly, after the district
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sufficiently representative of the claimants. 77 And, courts may select repeat
players by maintenance of court rosters of mediators and arbitrators 78 or by
selection of mediators or arbitrators during litigation. 79 Disputants also may
choose from private rosters of repeat play third party neutrals when they
turn to the lists of such organizations as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the Center for Public Resources (CPR), the National
Academy of Arbitrators, Resolve, JAMS-Endispute, or the increasing
court's opinion was handed down, Merrill Lynch stopped requiring its employees to
sign agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims; however, the change in
policy did not apply retroactively. This change was motivated by a class action
settlement in Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp.
1460 (N.D. Ii. 1998). See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 6-7; see also Cowle v.
PaineWebber, Inc., No. 98 CIV 2560 JSM, 1999 WL 194900, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
7, 1999) (discussing partiality in arbitrators).
77 The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) has recently begun
a major recruitment effort to diversify its arbitrators.
78 In the interest of full disclosure, I am a mediator on the roster of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
79 In a recent case, the contracted-for third party neutral, JAMS-Endispute,
refused to accept a case which did not meet its own due process protocols. The court
ordered the parties to arbitration with the AAA instead. See Great W. Mortgage Corp.
v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1997). The California Supreme Court
suggested that a potentially fraudulently represented arbitration system in a health care
contract might have been more acceptable if an independent and well-known provider
of ADR services, such as the AAA or JAMS-Endispute, were provided for in the
contract, rather than use of a self-administered arbitration program. See Engalla v.
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 925 (Cal. 1997). How are we to know
that such established ADR providers, as repeat players, are any fairer than the self-
administered program maintained by Permanente? See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32,
at 109, 121-23; see also Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 6 (discussing the lack of independence
of New York Stock Exchange repeat play arbitrators); Desiderio v. National Assoc. of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 516, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (contrasting the NYSE
arbitrators' lack of independence with the NASD provision for selection of a majority
of arbitrators from outside the securities industry); Hooters of Am., Inc., v. Phillips,
39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 627 (D.S.C. 1998) (finding unconscionable Hooters' provisions
for arbitrator selection because Hooters controlled the selection of individuals for the
list of available arbitrators). The Phillips court relied heavily on testimony from well-
respected experts in ADR, including Lewis Maltby, the cochair of the AAA National
Advisory Committee on Employment Arbitration, who all said that the arbitration
agreement at issue would not be accepted by any reputable provider because of its lack
of due process protocols and its overwhelming unfairness. See id. at 600-01.
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development of lists maintained by government agencies, 80 often "sorted"
for subject matter expertise.
Finally, the lawyers themselves who routinely appear in ADR
proceedings may be repeat players in all of the ways originally documented
by Galanter. 81 Just as repeat play plea bargainers may bargain away the
cases of their individual clients for long-term credibility or long-term goals,
union lawyers, repeat play lawyers in mass torts hearings, 82 and repeat play
representatives in ongoing ADR proceedings may enable repeat play
"Have" disputants to get their way-not only in system design of the whole
process, but in the concrete results achieved in each case. Increasingly,
lawyers and law firms are seeking training in "mediation advocacy" to
enable them to learn how to "win in ADR." 83
To the extent that many forms of ADR do not permit class actions,
reasoned or even written opinions, punitive damages, or other remedial
possibilities, 84 the very individuation of claims in ADR processing
potentially eliminates all of the reforms suggested by Galanter to counter
the advantages of repeat players against the "Have-not" one-shotter. 85 So
what is the currently existing evidence of dangers to justice or other
equalization goals in the use of ADR by repeat players? And, what is the
possibility of reform if what Galanter suggested is not feasible?8 6
80 See, e.g., CHARLES POu, JR., INTERIM REPORT TO THE U.S. ENvIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY ON ISSUES IN ESTABLISHING AN EPA-SPONSORED ROSTER FOR
NEUTRALS' SERVICES IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES 5-6 (1997).
81 See generally Galanter, supra note 1.
82 See conflicts noted in Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass out of Mass
Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Judging, Alternative Dispute
Resolution, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 513, 532 n.64
(1998).
83 See DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., INC., ADR FOR THE DEFENSE: ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION INCLUDING WINNING NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES 1-2 (1995)
(advertising a seminar designed to teach its participants how to "developol skills as an
advocate in ADR, rather than serv[e] as a neutral"); see also JOHN W. COOLEY,
MEDIATION ADVOCACY 48 (1996); ERIC GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN
MEDIATION 81 (1994).
84 These issues currently are being considered by the courts in the context of
arbitration but not mediation. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 32, at 331-33.
85 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 135-48.
86 At least one commentator has suggested that courts employ a two-tiered system
of review of arbitration conducted under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994), to take
account of whether the parties are "insiders" to a self-regulating community or whether
the arbitrated dispute is between an insider and outsider (another way of framing the
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III. Do THE "HAVES" OF ADR Do BETTER? THE DANGERS OF
REPEAT PLAYING IN ADR
Here I will review briefly both the theoretical and speculative claims
that have been made about the dangers of repeat play in ADR, as well as
the little we have already learned from empirical studies and court
decisions. I will conclude with suggestions for some very important further
questions for research to test these claims and propositions, just as we have
tested Galanter's original propositions.
With the increased use of ADR for a variety of different reasons, one
of the greatest ironies of the "movement" for better disputing8 7 has been its
recent adoption as a "mandatory" process in both private, contractual
contexts (usually involving mandatory predispute arbitration clauses) as
well as in-court referrals to ADR in the public sector (either through some
mandatory assignment or in "optional" application of ADR menus or
choices).88 To the extent that courts, employers, banks, health care
providers, the securities industry, franchisors, manufacturers, and now
even educational institutions are insisting on mandatory arbitration clauses
in their contracts and relationships with customers, clients, and patients, it
must be that such repeat players who deal with large volumes of customers
and clients believe there is some advantage to insisting on such processes.
To date, there has been little empirical testing of whether such mandatory
ADR processes in fact redound to the benefit of repeat players, but it is
quite clear that representatives of consumers, patients, employees, and
other individual claimants clearly believe that such mandated processes are
repeat player, one-shotter issue). See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931,
942-43 (1999). For other statutory proposals in the area of consumer-based arbitration,
see Paul Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts,
35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 231-32 (1998), and Richard Speidel, Consumer
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its
Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1069 app. at 1093 (1998).
87 For a fuller treatment of these issues, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When
Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals,
44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1872 (1997).
88 Also at issue is a hybrid form of ADR referral in which the parties are requested
by judges to try ADR, but feel more or less "coerced." For a catalogue of ADR
activity in the 94 federal district courts, see generally ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA
STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR. & CPR INST. FOR DIsPUTE RESOLUTION, ADR
AND SETTLEmENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTIuCT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND
LAWYERS (1996).
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problematic. To demonstrate, let us review the developments in a few
selected fields.
A. Employment
Perhaps the most interesting illustration of the role of repeat players in
ADR has occurred with respect to employment disputes. Following the
Supreme Court's approval of predispute allocation to mandatory arbitration
in a securities broker's registration application by requiring the claimant to
bring his age discrimination claim to securities arbitration, 89 the courts have
been faced with a series of legal questions as a myriad of employers have
sought to enforce predispute arbitration clauses on a wide variety of
employees. Employment lawyers protest that such "predispute" allocations
to arbitral fora, particularly involving important statutory claims (like
discrimination and other civil rights claims), are highly suspect as "cram-
down arbitration. "9 They maintain this "force-fed" arbitration advantages
employers, prevents full evidentiary presentations, avoids jury trials, and
prevents the possibility of some kinds of remedies (i.e., punitive damages),
often in settings where the decisionmakers have little or no expertise in the
complex statutory environment. There are some remaining legal questions,
such as whether employment (outside of immediate contact with interstate
commerce) will be exempt from the provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA). 91 Also still unresolved is whether Gilmer does or does not
89 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 35 (1991).
90 Wayne Outten, Speech at CPR Winter Meeting (Jan. 1997). (Mr. Outten is the
former President of the National Employment Lawyers Association, an association of
employment plaintiffs' lawyers.) Others have labeled this practice the "new yellow dog
contract." Judith Vladeck, Validity of ADR for Job Disputes: 'Yellow Dog Contracts'
Revisited, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1995, at 7; see also Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How
the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve
Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 1, 1-10 (1994); Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENy. U. L. REv. 1017, 1020 (1996).
91 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2 (discussing potential
exclusion of employment contracts in section 1 of the FAA); Estreicher, supra note 32,
at 1345, 1363-72. Conflicts have arisen in court cases. See Rushton v. Meijer, Inc.,
570 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that predispute agreements to
arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims were invalid according to public
policy). Subsequently, the court in Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 575
N.W.2d 287, 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), decided, contrary to Rushton, that such
clauses were permissible, so a special conflicts panel was convened to reconcile the
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overrule the Supreme Court's prior ruling that collective bargaining
arbitration would not preclude litigation in courts with respect to statutory
claims, 92 and whether employees must "knowingly and voluntarily" waive
cases. In Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999) [hereinafter Rembert II], the original Rembert opinion was vacated and
Rushton was overruled. See id. at 230. Rembert II found that predispute arbitration
agreements were valid, provided that the procedures they encompassed were fair and
the agreement waived no substantive rights and remedies. See id. The court also
maintained that section 1 of the FAA strongly favored arbitration and then cited
subsequent cases interpreting the FAA in favor of arbitration of employment statutory
claims. Rembert 1I cited Cole v. Burns with approval when discussing its sanctioning of
predispute arbitration agreements for employment claims. See id. at 222, 224-26, 228
(citing Cole v. Burns Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(sustaining employment predispute arbitration as long as certain protections are met,
and claimants have some costs paid by employers)). Thus, Rembert II is no longer in
conflict with Cole, as Rushton was. See Rushton, 570 N.W.2d at 275; see also Paladino
v. Arnet Computer Tech., 134 F.3d 1054, 1056 n.1 (1lth Cir. 1998) (citing volume of
scholarly work disagreeing with narrow construction of section 1 of the FAA, finding
section 1 did not exempt plaintiff because he was not directly engaged in the movement
of goods in interstate commerce); James B. Geren, Recent Development, 13 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsp. REsOL. 263, 266 (1997). Compare Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71
F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1995) (construing section 1 of the FAA narrowly so that it
covers employees only directly engaged in the movement of interstate goods in
commerce) with Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding section 1 of the FAA does not apply to employment or labor contracts after a
lengthy discussion of legislative history and statutory construction). See Koveleskie v.
SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1999) for a listing of the
many circuits that have upheld employment contracts as included in the reach of section
1 of the FAA. But see Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir.
1997) (denying enforcement of a predispute mandatory arbitration clause in
employment); Matthew Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the FAA-Reconsidered,
48 LAB. L.J. 329, 329-35 (1997).
92 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974); see also
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 395, 397 (1998) (holding
that a collective bargaining agreement did not expressly waive trial of statutory rights
and properly remit to arbitration). Thus, the tension between the Gilmer and Alexander
lines of cases is not resolved by this Supreme Court decision. See Beason v. United
Techs. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (D. Conn. 1999) (following Wright by
explaining that the court will not compel arbitration of statutory claims if the collective
bargaining agreement provision regarding forum is not clear and unmistakable while
also making the point that the Supreme Court did not resolve the tension between
Gilmer and Alexander); see also Greer v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., No. 97-74934, 1999
WL 704232, at *4 & n.6 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 1999); Stanton v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
Civ. A. No. 98-4989, 1999 WL 236603, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1999).
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their rights to a judicial setting; 93 however, most courts have sustained
employment arbitration against a wide variety of attacks.94
In a classic illustration of Galanter's suggested reforms for reallocating
power in disputing, the employment plaintiffs' bar organized and threatened
a boycott of any and all organizations that provided arbitration services
when contracts provided for "predispute" arbitration in nonconsensual
settings. The National Employment Lawyers Association -(NELA)
threatened to boycott the AAA, JAMS-Endispute, and other providers of
ADR services who agreed to arbitrate employment statutory claims through
contractual assignments that were contrary to Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) policies. 95
As a result of concerns about and objections to compulsory arbitration
of employment statutory claims expressed by the organized plaintiffs' bar
93 Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting 137 CoNG. REC. S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)).
The Ninth Circuit (and Judge Rheinhardt, in particular, himself a former labor lawyer
and repeat player in this type of litigation) has been particularly active in striking down
nonvoluntary assignments of employment disputes to predispute contractual arbitral
fora. See id. at 1185 (holding a female securities broker did not have to arbitrate her
sex discrimination claims where underlying rights were protected by a judicial forum
under Title VHI); see also Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 397; Nelson v. Cyprus Baghdad
Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997); Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 113 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1997); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d
1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).
94 There has been a split in the circuit courts of appeals on some of these issues.
See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 1998); Carrington
& Haagen, supra note 32, at 370-71; Estreicher, supra note 32, at 1345; Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 32, at 672 & n.210; Stephen Ware,
Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSrRA L. Rv. 83 (1996).
Compare Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 376 (concurring with the majority of other circuits
that allow predispute arbitration agreements in Title VII statutory claims) and Mouton
v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 147 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no need for a
knowing and voluntary waiver of access to a judicial forum and compelling arbitration
of Title VII claim) with Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170
F.3d 1, 21 (lst Cir. 1999) (finding- -minimal level of notice" to plaintiff regarding
mandatory arbitration as reason not to compel arbitration) and Duffleld, 144 F.3d at
1203 (disallowing compulsory arbitration of civil rights claims and finding
unenforceable securities exchange registration because it required compulsory
arbitration as a condition of employment).
95 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 56 n.66 (providing fuller accounts of
these boycott threats); see also Estreicher, supra note 32, at 1348; National
Employment Lawyers Will Boycott ADR Providers, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP.
240, 240 (1995).
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and other civil rights organizations that testified before the Dunlop
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, a Due
Process Protocol was developed by participating organizations that included
the AAA, the NELA, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the
American Bar Association-Labor Section, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), representatives of
several unions, management law firms, and the Society for Professionals in
Dispute Resolution. 96 Unfortunately, the ad hoc group which created the
employment Due Process Protocol deadlocked on an important issue and
thus created a somewhat confusing document. Because the participating
groups would not agree to prohibit totally predispute contractual arbitration
clauses for statutory claims, employers, therefore, were not prohibited from
adopting such clauses. 97 Yet, at the same time, the protocol states that
"[e]mployees should not be permitted to waive their right to judicial relief
of statutory .claims arising out of the employment relationship for any
reason." 98  Thus, the Gilmer-Alexander tension (between statutory
employment rights being guaranteed a judicial hearing in addition to or in
lieu of contractual arbitration)99 remains in this private protocol, just as it
remains somewhat unresolved in the legal arena. The Protocol attempts to
establish some minimal procedural protections such as a right of
representation (including a recommendation of employer reimbursement of
at least part of the attorneys fees and costs),10° access to information, a
recommendation for mediators and arbitrators with statutory expertise and
training, disclosure of conflicts of interest, use of statutes and other legal
materials in granting relief, authority to grant any and all relief which
would be available to courts enforcing relevant laws, and a written
96 See JoHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DIsPUTES 45 (1997); Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration
of Statutory Employment Disputes, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (534 Individual Empl.
Rts. Manual) 401, 404 (May 9, 1995).
97 See Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory
Employment Disputes, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (534 Individual Empl. Rts. Manual)
at 401-02.
98 See id. at 402.
99 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
100 An approach which at least one court has required. See Cole v. Burns Int'l
See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (H. Edwards, C.J., former labor
law professor and arbitrator).
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opinion' 0 ' (which is final and binding and thus subject to the complex
confusion of labor law and general arbitral finality). 10 2
At around the same time, other private organizations of dispute
resolution providers adopted similar protocols to avoid the threat of a
boycott or because of their own concerns about due process and fairness in
compulsory arbitration settings.' 03 Most recently, the major players in
securities arbitration have announced various policies (after both threatened
and actual lawsuits challenging compulsory arbitration in employment
contexts) to withdraw contractual mandatory arbitration of statutory
employment claims and to approve of more "voluntary" arbitration in the
employment context for securities brokers and other employees. 104
So what is all the fuss about it and does it matter? On one level, it is
ironic that arbitration should be such a hot-button issue in labor relations.
Arbitration of collective bargaining grievances has long been the mainstay
of labor disputing in the union context as the condition for prevention of
strikes and as negotiated for by the repeat players of union and
management. Yet, as the rate of unionization decreases and as the "law of
the land" rather than the "law of the shop" is more relevant to the pursuit
of both individual and group statutory claims, employees, labor lawyers,
and civil rights activists have been most distrustful of an "employer-
controlled" dispute resolution system that is thought to lack many
procedural due process protections and which may be controlled by
decisionmakers who do not understand the legal entitlements at issue. 105
101 See Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory
Employment Disputes, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (534 Individual Empl. Rts. Manual)
at 402-04.
102 See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); The Steelworkers
Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564, 567-68, 577-78, 569-99 (1960).
103 The NAA, JAMS-Endispute, and CPR all prepared and circulated their
versions of due process protocols, both for their ADR providers and for guidance to
drafters of clauses and system designers.
104 On June 23, 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that as
of January 1, 1999, employees of the securities industry no longer would be required to
refer their employment discrimination claims to arbitration under a proposed and
approved change of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. See SEC Eliminates
Mandatory Arbitration, ADR REP., July 8, 1998, at 4, 4.
105 Many experienced labor arbitrators have weighed in heavily against mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination
Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
381, 383-84 (1996); Robert Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration
of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 653.
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Preliminary evidence suggests that critics of "cram-down" arbitration
are right and often right exactly for the reasons Marc Galanter would have
predicted. In what is one of the first most rigorous assessments of
employment arbitration, researcher Lisa Bingham has found that some
repeat players may do better in certain kinds of employment arbitration and
that the rule systems do matter. 106 In a study of AAA employment cases
processed under the Commercial Arbitration Rules (and used principally by
high-level managers with contracts), in contrast to those processed under
the separate Employment Arbitration Rules (used more by lower-level
employees subject to compulsory arbitration clauses), being a "Have" or a
repeat player mattered. Higher-level employees with resources for
representation and use of the Commercial Arbitration Rules were more
likely to gain favorable results than those lower-level employees who were
subject to the Employment Arbitration Rules.' 0 7 Earlier studies have
documented that in some industrial settings, having a lawyer representative
does affect outcomes, and some arbitrators are clearly partial to one side.108
Yet, with all of the concerns about compulsory arbitration in the
employment area, some other important issues may be missed. As the
Dunlop Commission was originally poised to support ADR in employment
cases in order to cut costs, reduce processing time, and generally increase
access to fora for resolving employment disputes (especially in settings
where the potential for ongoing relationships between employees and
106 See Lisa Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment
Arbitration: A Look atActual Cases, 47 LAB. L. J. 108, 113-16 (1996).
107 See id. For more recent results and an excellent review of the literature,
empirical studies, and implications for employees as one-shotters, see Lisa Bingham,
Focus on Arbitration After Gilmer: Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect,
1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 189, 212-15 (1997) (suggesting that
employees in nonunion contexts are still mostly one-shotters and are often
unrepresented; also that employees in arbitrations against repeat player employers do
not fare as well as employees against nonrepeat player employers). But cf. Lisa
Bingham, An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States: Law, Public
Policy and Data, 23 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 5, 5-19 (1998); Lisa Bingham, Is There a
Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes?: An Analysis of Actual Cases
and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 369, 380-84 (1995) (suggesting that
arbitrators are not biased in favor of employers in nonunion arbitrations).
108 See, e.g., Richard Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and
Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 543, 553-54 (1987).
Authors of the 1995 Government Accounting Office study of use of ADR in over two
thousand businesses expressed some concern about the lack of due process in some
settings. See DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 96, at 75.
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employers might suggest different kinds of relief), the debate over the
desirability of at least some forms of ADR and the issues surrounding more
consensual ADR may have been lost. Some other studies have suggested
that ADR may not always be a bad thing in these contexts. Craig
McEwen's recent evaluation of a pilot project in mediation for the EEOC
demonstrated some success, both with respect to settlement rates and
satisfaction with the process. 109 Even the former Chair of the EEOC has
suggested that while "not a panacea" for employment discrimination cases,
ADR can help resolve cases in ways which are perfectly consistent with
civil rights laws. 110 He has argued that "there remains this culture of
litigation that believes the only way to be effective is to litigate." 1"l
To the extent that some parties might actually do "better" in some ADR
settings, with more creative solutions to their problems, or by achieving
transfers, promotions, or front pay, some forms of ADR, notably
mediation, might turn out to provide more Pareto optimal remedies for
certain parties. For instance, in cases of systematic discrimination, EEOC
actions or class actions are still possible. Thus, what is "better" for
particular individual litigants, in comparison to classes of litigants, is not
always clear.
Differences in the needs of particular claimants and in particular kinds
of employment claims have led to debates among the claiming
communities. While some advocates are opposed to the privatizing nature
of mediation of sexual harassment claims, for example, others suggest that
more claims will be brought, along with increased access to justice, if both
parties can be assured of some privacy and the possibility of appropriately
tailored solutions. 112
109 CRAIG A. MCEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMhSSION'S PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM 52-66, 72-84 (1994).
110 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 96, at 132; Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII,
Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 583, 583.
111 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 96, at 132; cf. Mandatory Binding Arbitration
and Employment Discrimination Disputes, 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) (Notices)
3101, 3103-04 (July 10, 1997) (stating that arbitration systems imposed as a condition
of employment are fundamentally inconsistent with the civil rights laws); Ellen J.
Vargyas, EEOC Explains Its Decision: Verdict on Mandatory Binding Arbitration in
Employment, 52 DisP. REsOL. J., Fall 1997, at 10, 14. Of course, these positions of the
EEOC spokespeople can be reconciled easily by noting the differences in arbitration
and mediation processes-not all ADR in employment is the same thing.
112 See, e.g., Howard Gadiin, Sexual Harassment Mediating, in SExUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 186, 186-87 (Bernice Sandier & Robert Shoop eds., 1997);
Howard Gadlin, Careful Maneuvers: Mediating Sexual Harassment, 7 NEGOTIATION J.
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To the extent that there are serious questions about repeat play
advantage and fairness, some (including myself) would argue that the ADR
process itself should be made more responsive and fair to one-shotters
rather than assuming that just because there are repeat player advantages in
ADR, they will not be present in court as well.113
For some, the issues of fairness and advantage can be dealt with by
program or system design. The internal employee grievance and dispute
system used at Brown and Root114 is often cited as one which attempts to
minimize repeat player advantage by having costs (of the arbitration, of
claimant's lawyer's fees, and of some witness fees) paid for by the
employer and by utilizing a multitiered program in which employees use
internal grievances (an "Open-Door Policy"), nonbinding mediation, or
internal conferences, and then finally binding arbitration processes which
approximate some system of informality, coupled with formality and
139, 142-48 (1991); James Hoenig, Mediation in Sexual Harassment: Balancing the
Sensitivities, DisP. RESOL. J., Dec. 1993, at 51, 51-52.
113 In other contexts I have labeled this "litigation romanticism." See Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 87, at 1900. Those who criticize ADR fail to remember Galanter's
original messages-the "Haves" come out ahead in court, see Galanter, supra note 1,
at 98-103, so leaving ADR for court will not necessarily correct the problems. In at
least one suggestive finding, claimants were found to do better in some kinds of civil
rights cases before judges without juries, suggesting perhaps that single decisionmakers
(whether judges or arbitrators) may deliver more "justice" than the jury trial so often
desired by plaintiffs' attorneys. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial
by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1171 (1992);
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1586 (1989) (reporting on complexity of outcomes
at trial in certain kinds of civil rights cases and suggesting that cases that go to trial are
often a "skewed" picture of representative disputes or legal issues). Of course, judges
are not arbitrators, and many have argued that judges in particular are needed to rule on
discrimination claims. See Alleyne, supra note 105, at 392-94; Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HAgv. L. REv. 668, 671
(1986); Gorman, supra note 105, at 641. In a recent illustration of how wrong the
intuition or "folklore" about plaintiffs' advantages in the judicial system can be, an
African-American lawyer won a sizable jury verdict for discrimination from his law
firm (for partnership denial and work assignments), and then the D.C. Circuit reversed
completely for lack of substantial evidence. See Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis,
116 F.3d 1549, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see generally PAUL BAR=EFt, THE GOOD
BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999).
114 See DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 96, at 75-78, 82-83, 86, 90-91 (describing a
private arbitration system in employment thought to include many employee
protections).
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"tiers" of appeals. 115 Additionally, mediators and arbitrators may be
chosen from outside the company116 when "legally protected rights" are at
issue. 117 Although such programs continue to present other repeat play
issues (such as whether a system paid for by the employer is likely to be
experienced as -"neutral" by the employee), they represent an attempt to
balance cost and delay reduction for both employer and employee with
attempts to enforce employee rights. These systems also make it possible
for employers to engage in early monitoring and correction of problems,
both in individual cases and by the data collection and observations of
patterns that are made possible by such systems.
This is an area in which the controversies are likely to continue, with
legal issues still unresolved, until and unless the Supreme Court definitively
decides that all employment matters, like the securities and consumer cases
it has decided, can be referred to mandatory predispute arbitration. If the
Supreme Court does decide to do this (as it has deferred to arbitration in so
many other areas), it may lead to an increased spurt of unionization or
other collective action on the part of employees, as well as by their
representatives. In the meantime, many commentators and practitioners
continue to suggest reforms (not unlike Galanter's suggestions) to make
employment arbitration more responsive to individual employees-by
encouraging employers to pay for representation, by observing the Due
Process Protocol, and by allowing lawyers to act as substitute repeat
players when they appear in the same fora. 118 The idea is that macro justice
concerns can be met and indeed enhanced with use of ADR where ADR
can increase access and reduce cost and time for employee grievances, as
115 See id.
116 Clearly, the perceived fairness of such a program depends on the perceived
fairness and diversity of the mediators and arbitrators. So far, most of the lawsuits
attacking the lack of demographic diversity among mediators or arbitrators (especially
in the securities field) have failed. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting claims of lack of
diversity of arbitrators for no showing of harm, but refusing to enforce compulsory
employment arbitration clause in securities case when statutory rights, i.e., sexual
harassment, were at issue); Olson v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 876 F. Supp. 850,
852 (N.D. Tex. 1995), af4'd, 71 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 1995). However, organizations like
the NASD and the EEOC have made conscious efforts to recruit more diversified ADR
providers. See DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 96, at 107.
117 See program description in DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 96, at 75-76, and
Estreicher, supra note 32, at 1351.
118 See, e.g., DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 96, at 45; Alleyne, supra note 105, at
426-27.
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well as provide for more tailor-made solutions, at least in some cases.
Indeed, although there are those who argue that the main advantage for
repeat players is the ability to manipulate rules, fora, and decisionmakers,
some are concerned that if alternative justice systems are perceived as
efficient and receptive to good solutions, they may actually increase the
amount of claiming." 9 As some have argued, use of ADR has enabled
organizations to internalize their disputing, in both employment and other
arenas, by placing their dispute mechanisms within the organization and
taking them "out of court" altogether. 120 The tension for repeat players is
to create a system which is fair enough to pass judicial or collective action
muster, but not one that invites so many claims that control and efficiency
are lost. 121 At least one repeat player institution has already recognized this
dilemma, and it is to that field that I now turn.
B. Health
In one of the few cases that has recently questioned the use of
mandatory predispute allocation to an arbitral forum, the Supreme Court of
California recognized the power of repeat players to control the forum,
decisionmaker, and rules in order to maximize outcomes. In Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, Inc., the court remanded for further fact
finding a claim that a major health organization had fraudulently
represented its arbitration program in health care contracts governing
malpractice claims. 122 In a rare use of empirical data, the trial court had
found, citing a statistical study of Kaiser's (defendant health care
organization's) arbitration program, that instead of the sixty days promised
in promotional material and the contract for choice of arbitrator and
commencement of the process, it was taking an average of 674 days to
119 See, e.g., George Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem,
69 B.U. L. REv. 527, 557-59 (1989).
120 See Lauren Edelman & Mark Suchman, When the Haves Hold Court: The
Internalization of Disputing in Organizational Fields, 33 L. & Soc'Y REv.
(forthcoming 1999).
121 Some research has already demonstrated that "internal dispute resolution
systems" may in fact increase claiming within organizations. See generally Lauren
Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the
Workplace, 27 L. & Soc'Y REv. 497 (1993); see also Edelman & Suchman, supra note
120.
122 See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 916, 925 (Cal.
1997).
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appoint a neutral third arbitrator (in a three person panel) and 863 days
(nearly two and a half years) for the average case to reach an arbitration
hearing.123 This was in contrast to a finding that a lawsuit in the county in
which the case occurred would have come to trial within ten months.
Among the various aspects of the program that troubled the court was the
fact that Kaiser maintained a self-administered arbitration program,
choosing not only the partisan arbitrator, but the neutral third arbitrator,
and using its own counsel to manage the entire proceeding. 124 Without
finding the contract to be one of adhesion or legally unconscionable, the
court did express concern about how much real bargaining had taken
place, 125 especially when Mr. Engalla's employer was too small to
negotiate terms and was offered the health plan on a "take it or leave it
basis. " 12 6
The Engalla case has proven to be a rallying point for consumer
activists who have been contesting compulsory arbitration clauses in a wide
variety of consumer contracts, including banking, 127 franchising, 128 and
securities transactions. 129 Although the Engalla court did not ultimately
accept an unconscionability or adhesion contract theory, 130 the court did
123 See id. at 912-13, 917.
124 See id. at 918, 925.
125 See id. at 925.
126 Id. at 924.
127 See Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 944916, 1994 WL 660730, at *8 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (allowing addition of an arbitration clause to already
existing contract with bank's customers), rev'd in part, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 276, 280,
290-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a compulsory arbitration clause unenforceable
because the addition of the arbitration clause was not agreed to by both parties-it was
sent in a "bill stuffer" by the bank to its customers. The court also stated the decision
had little to do with California's acknowledged public policy supporting ADR; this was
a matter of a one-sided contract provision of which the court disapproved.); see also
ERiK MOLLER ET AL., PRIVATH DIsPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE BANKING INDuSTRY 31-32
(1995) (reporting that banks found private binding arbitration to be cost-effective for
the institutions by reducing cases, achieving smaller verdicts, and resulting in lower
litigation costs. The report raises public policy concerns about the loss of deterrence for
consumer fraud or other unfair trade practices when disputes are privatized.).
128 See Doctors Assocs. v. Cassaroto, 517 U.S. 681, 682-83 (1996).
129 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 54
(1995).
130 See Engalla, 938 P.2d at 925. A few cases have struck down arbitration
clauses as not being freely contracted for or as unenforceable contracts of adhesion. See
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, 121 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 1997); Stirlen
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look, for the first time, at the actual operation of the program.' 31 Thus,
data on outcomes and obvious patterns of unfair outcomes may become
significant in future cases.
To respond to the Engalla case, the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and
the Kaiser Permanente Medical Group established the Blue Ribbon
Advisory Panel to make recommendations to revise the program and
respond to some of the court's concerns. The report of that committee
recommended some changes to the arbitration program (shortening time for
processing, moving to single person arbitration panels, establishing system-
wide ombuds, and using an independent arbitration administrator, as well
as encouraging early settlement discussions), but it did not recommend
abandoning mandatory arbitration, which it found to be an industry
norm.132 Thus, in the name of trying to ensure fast and efficient processes
for consumers and cost savings to themselves, large institutions likely will
continue to attempt to require arbitration or other forms of mandatory ADR
while they tread the delicate line of meeting judicial standards for
approval. 133
C. Securities
I will not review in great detail here the substantial literature and cases
reporting on and sustaining the use of mandatory arbitration in disputes
between investor-customers and brokers and brokers as employees 134 which
v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 151-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Anthony
Arons, Packaging ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 27, 27; Michele Marcucci, Freeing
ADR, CAL. LAw., Feb. 1998, at 29, 74-75 (noting that former CEO of Supercuts
became the CEO of JAMS-Endispute! Dispute resolution, apparently, can be delivered
like haircuts!).
131 See Engalla, 938 P.2d at 912-13, 917-18.
13 2 See EUGENE F. LYNCH ET AL., THE KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION
SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 1-2 (1998).
133 This likely will require the use of more empirical research as developers of
ADR systems, and those who attack them will need empirical data to prove their macro
justice or fairness claims. The Engalla court seemed receptive to empirical data
demonstrating how the program actually worked. See Engalla, 938 P.2d at 912-13,
917. Compare the resistance of the Supreme Court to presentation of empirical data in
connection with challenges to the death penalty in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
293-97 (1987), cited in LAzARus, supra note 37, at 187.
134 Some believe that these two very different sets of disputes should be treated
differently, and the NASD has made some efforts in this regard. See SEC Eliminates
Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 104, at 4-5 (discussing NASD rule change to
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have been well canvassed elsewhere, 135 except t6 suggest that there is a
certain irony in the use of mandatory arbitration in the securities field when
brokers, who support arbitration in disputes with their customers, seek to
avoid arbitration in their own employment disputes with brokerage houses.
In short, the repeat player in one setting may not be the repeat player in
another. In the securities field, complaints abound from both sides-that
arbitration has become too judicialized and formal, that it is not formal
enough, that it does not provide protection of procedures and remedies, and
that it privatizes important public enforcement issues. 136 Like the Kaiser
Foundation's Blue Ribbon Committee, the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) has recognized that with increased use of,
challenges to, and judicial scrutiny of compulsory arbitration systems,
internal reforms may be the best way to sustain arbitration programs and
whatever repeat player stability they may now have. 137 Thus, the NASD
has begun a broadened recruitment effort to seek more "public" and diverse
members of its arbitration panels in order to respond to riticism of repeat
player industry dominance in arbitration panels as well as to engage in
procedural streamlining of processes, intended to make the process more
"investor-friendly."
eliminate mandatory arbitration of statutory employment claims); see also ARBrrRATION
PoLicY TASK FORCE, NATIONAL Assoc. OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., SECURrIEs
ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF TnE ARBITRATION PoLicY TASK FORCE TO THE
BOARD OF GOvERNORS 93 (1996) [hereinafter ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE];
David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40
ARiz. L. REv. 1101, 1105 (1998).
135 See generally Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities
Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1459 (1996); Carrington & Haagen, supra note 32;
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 32.
136 See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration:
Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1335, 1349-56 (1996); see also Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
STAN. L. REv. 497, 499 (1991) (reporting on how private settlements in securities
actions threaten enforcement of important securities legal policies).
137 See Ruder, supra note 134, at 1105; see also ARBITRATION POLICY TASK
FORCE, supra note 134, at 17-18 (recommending several reforms, including the use of
mediation and early neutral evaluation, discovery, and recruitment and training of
arbitrators, but recommending a cap on punitive damages and continuing mandatory
predispute arbitration). As Lauren Edelman and Mark Suchman have suggested,
however, this "internalization" of disputing converts organizational repeat players into
more than advantaged disputants. With such internal dispute resolution mechanisms
certain organizations become disputant, lawyer, judge, and appellate body all at once.
See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 120.
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Thus, from several of the arenas we have reviewed-employment,
health, and securities-it is clear that large organizations favor their dispute
resolution systems (usually arbitration) so much that they are willing to
undertake potentially substantial internal reforms to avoid judicial
nullification.
D. Consumer-Commercial Disputes
Given that arbitration historically was founded in commercial
disputes, 138 at least in the merchant-merchant context, it is interesting that
some of the most serious opposition to the use of compulsory contractual
arbitration has come from commercial lawyers who suggest that in the
consumer context (and even in the hybrid relationship of franchisor-
franchisee), mandatory arbitration needs regulation. Among others, Richard
Speidel has suggested that the contractual basis of arbitration is lost when
consent is not real or where there are great power disparities between the
parties. 139 If courts are unwilling to examine the reality of contract
formation, 14° then the FAA may itself need to be amended to protect
important rights of the one-shot consumer 141 who cannot effectively bargain
with a repeat play contractor. 142 Thus, where commercial lawyers may
138 See, e.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrrHouT LAW? 32 (1983).
139 See Speidel, supra note 136, at 1339, 1349-50.
140 Recently, two circuit courts of appeals split in their determination of whether
virtually identical arbitration clauses in consumer credit contracts were enforceable. See
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 178 F.3d 1149, 1158 (11th Cir. 1999)
(striking down a consumer loan arbitration clause that, because it was silent with
respect to the issues of who would bear costs and fees and how much they might be,
might violate the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1994 & Supp. III
1997)); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11th Cir.
1998). In contrast, the Third Circuit sustained an arbitration clause in a home
improvement contract, despite the lack of mutuality between the (same) finance
company and the homeowner, as long as the parties provided each other with
consideration beyond the promise to arbitrate. The court rejected several claims of
unconscionability, including the lack of mutuality in the promise to arbitrate, choice of
arbitrator, the size of printed words, and location of the arbitration provision in relation
to the rest of the contract, holding that the FAA provided both protections and
justifications for upholding the contractual provision to arbitrate. See Harris v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181-84 (3d Cir. 1999).
141 See Speidel, supra note 86, at 1079 (suggesting that we may need freedom
from contract as well as freedom to contract!).
142 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997)
(sustaining a predispute arbitration clause where a purchaser did not even know he had
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choose alternative dispute resolution or less formal processes in disputes
with each other 43 (as repeat players to repeat players), 144 when disputes
are between merchants (and large twentieth century merchants at that) and
single consumers, the "informalism" may well work against the one-
shotters.
Of course, as I shall suggest below, 145 we do not actually know much
about whether one-shot consumers do worse in merchant operated
arbitration or privatized dispute resolution systems than they do in court or
in other fora (or if they do nothing at all). We assume they do fare worse
because we assume that dispute resolution systems chosen and maintained
by one of the disputants therefore must benefit that disputant. Why else
would all these institutional disputants be defending their arbitration
systems so vigorously against consumer legal attacks? It is clear that such
institutional disputants believe that they do better, and that such systems are
cheaper and better for them than other forms of disputing, but we do not
really know.
Some companies that make "customer satisfaction" their top priority
may actually be responsive to consumers through dispute or grievance
systems, preferring a reputation for "the customer is always right" or at
least fast resolution. 146 Clearly, we need, in the consumer area, the kind of
rigorous examination of the repeat player and one-shot ADR outcome
evaluations that Lisa Bingham is conducting in the employment arena.
agreed to such a clause until the contract arrived, after he had opened the shrink wrap
of his computer, and complained thirty days later about computer malfunctions), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1998). So now we are responsible for contract terms after the
point of purchase! See Carrington, supra note 24, at 231 (proposing independent
federal legislation to eliminate the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in some
consumer and employment contracts).
143 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 60-62 (1963).
144 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 130 (1992).
145 See infra Part IV.
146 See Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and
Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 1, 5 (1993) (suggesting that ADR systems are not responsive to consumers,
"passifying them" when they should, instead, litigate); see also RALPH NADER &
WESLEY SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 298-300 (1996); Laura Nader, A Reply to Professor King, 10 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 99, 101-02 (1994).
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E. Education
Perhaps more troubling in the spread of usage of compulsory
arbitration systems is the recent application of compulsory arbitration in
education. The First Circuit recently sustained a compulsory arbitration
clause in a private school's suspension process when parents of a student
sought to raise an Americans with Disabilities Act147 statutory claim. 148
Similarly, students enrolled in vocational schools in California were
initially compelled to use a contractual arbitration process when they sued
for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and failure to deliver educational
services. 149 The court treated the enrollment contracts as consumer
contracts and held them not to be contracts of adhesion. Further, the
students were not specially protected by the Student Protection Act, which
was intended to prevent the use of arbitration in educational matters. This
judicial deference to compulsory arbitration procedures may represent a
new low point in judicial efforts to clear caseloads by referring cases to
private fora. 150
F. Courts and Judicial Processes
As Professors Carrington and Haagen have suggested, by developing a
jurisprudence in favor of arbitration, the Supreme Court has allowed parties
to contract for jurisdiction (or to dictate jurisdiction!), the one part of
American procedure that we assumed was assured by constitutional and
statutory rules and protections. In rulings that have sustained private
arbitration as adjudication and supported both limited, as well as expanded,
judicial appellate scrutiny of arbitration decisions (in seeming disregard of
147 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994 &
Supp. 111996).
148 See Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 156 (1st Cir. 1998).
149 See Webb v. Eldorado Colleges, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 104 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998), withdrawn, No. S069405, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3851, at *1 (Cal. June 10,
1998).
150 Note that not all ADR in educational matters is necessarily disadvantageous to
students or parents. Some forms of mediation have proven to be quite effective in
encouraging parental participation in educational decisions and in crafting customized
solutions, particularly in the special education area. See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE
CONDITIONS OF DIsCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNrrY, AND BUREAUCRACY 103
(1986); Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest Proposal: Mediating IDEA Disputes Without
Splitting the Baby, 28 J. OF L. & EDuc. 37, 44-48 (1999).
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both law on federal court jurisdiction and the FAA's standards for judicial
review), 151 courts seem-to be moving jurisdictional lines fluidly between
private and public fora. The U.S. Supreme Court has left standing a
California ruling that permits arbitration to be used for classwide relief.1 52
Most recently, courts have expanded contractual enforcement of
jurisdictional matters such as whether there might be judicial review and if
so, what standard of review might be applied. 153 While the courts that have
upheld these clauses have explained themselves by saying they are just
enforcing contracts and that these clauses merely supplement the default
review standard of the FAA, there is little discussion of why courts are
allowing parties to dictate the jurisdiction of Article Im courts. We all know
that in other contexts, it has been settled and uncontested that parties may
not confer jurisdiction by agreement (i.e., subject matter jurisdiction).
Moreover, how is the one-shotter supposed to understand what she is
giving up in an arbitration agreement that provides for more limited or
heightened judicial appellate scrutiny of an arbitration award?
As "Haves" increasingly push the "Have-nots" into privatized justice
systems, what will be left in the courts? Will Galanter's study of the
"Haves" and "Have-nots" in litigation simply be of historical interest as
employees, consumers, students, patients, investors, and all potential
litigants are pushed into private arbitration systems?
Even when such parties perceive themselves as injured and try to
litigate, they will find they are increasingly being channeled into various
151 See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
152 See Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 793 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (ruling that classwide arbitration was permissible where allowed by state law and
was not preempted by the FAA), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2338 (1999); see also New
England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1988).
153 See New England Utils. v. Hydro Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 71 (D. Mass.
1998) (allowing agreement for heightened judicial scrutiny with reservation); see also
UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997-98 (8th Cir.
1998) (putting off the question of whether parties can agree to heightened standard of
review, giving credit to both sides of the debate). Compare Chicago Typographical
Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991)
(opinion of Posner, J.) (stating that parties cannot contract for federal jurisdiction) and
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (D.S.C. 1998) (finding
arbitration agreement unconscionable in part because employee acceded to "impaired or
sharply curtailed judicial review") with Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130
F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing agreement for heightened judicial scrutiny)
and Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-98 (5th Cir.
1995) (allowing agreement for heightened judicial scrutiny).
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ADR proceedings within the courts themselves. I will not fully review here
the extensive literature on the use of mandatory, referred, or voluntary
ADR programs in the courts, 154 which remains highly controversial. Recent
studies completed by the RAND Corporation and the Federal Judicial
Center differed slightly in their findings about whether mediation,
arbitration, early neutral evaluations, and other forms of ADR saved
litigants and courts time and money. The studies did document relatively
high levels of satisfaction with such programs by both litigants and the
repeat players of the litigation system-lawyers, judges, and court
administrators, findings that are now consistent with many studies of court-
annexed arbitration and other ADR programs. 155 Though there remain
concerns about less well-endowed litigants in these systems 156 and mixed
data with respect to use when programs are not mandatory, it is clear that
many courts will continue to require some form of ADR. 157 Though there
154 See generally DONNA STIENSTRA & THOMAS E. WILLGING, ALTERNATIVES TO
LITIGATION: Do THEY HAVE A PLACE IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS? (1995);
Symposium, COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH: A REPORT ON
CURRENT RESEARCH FINDINGS- IMPLICATIONS FOR COURT AND FUTURE RESEARCH
NEEDS (Susan Keilitz ed., 1994); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 87.
155 See, e.g., BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN
DISTRICT COURTS 46, 63-69, 77-83, 85-93, 111-18 (1990); Lind et al., In the Eye of
the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice
System, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 953, 980 (1990). I recently completed an empirical
evaluation of the arbitration program in the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and found similarly high satisfaction rates among users
(principally lawyers and judges). See MENKEL-MEADOW, REPORT TO THE ARBITRATION
COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA (1997) (on file with author). For results of RAND studies, see
generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION
OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY
AND INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996); and DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CTR., A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1997).
156 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169,
2228-34 (1993) (criticizing, among other things, the potential for additional layers of
costs imposed on poorer litigants who must arbitrate and risk loss of costs in de novo
appeals for constitutionally protected trials).
157 A new law enacted by Congress now requires all federal courts to consider
some form of ADR. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
315, § 651(b), 112 Stat. 2993, 2294 (1998).
(Vol. 15:1 1999]
REPEAT PLAYERS IN ADR
are differences of views within the judiciary as well as the bar about the
advantages and disadvantages of adding ADR to more traditional court
functions,158 we still do not have good data on outcome differences or
usage patterns of ADR with which to evaluate the strident claims made
about ADR in the courts. 159 More importantly, we do not really know how
the availability of ADR in courts (and in the private sector) affects choices
about claiming behavior 160-whether more will claim in the first place (the
increased "access" argument) or whether the choice of how or where to
claim will change (whether claimants will resist ADR and pursue litigation,
pursue both, or whether more litigants are "lumping it"161 after "losing" in
ADR).
IV. Do THE "HAVES" COME OUT AHEAD?
WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
This Article might surprise some readers of my earlier work. I am,
after all, a great proponent of ADR where its purposes are to provide
greater party participation and more creative or flexible solutions to
problems, conflicts, disputes, and transactions. But I have always been a
proponent of pluralism in disputing, recognizing that the structuring of
disputes may require different processes for different kinds of cases or
issues.1 62 To the extent that disputing in many quarters has moved away
from litigation to ADR, and a particular form of ADR at that-compulsory
predispute mandated arbitration (or analogous forms of arbitration in
158 See Brock Hornsby, Federal Court-Annexed ADR: After the Hoopla, 7 FJC
Dmc'roNs 26, 26 (1994).
159 See Craig McEwen, Mediation in Context: New Questions for Research, DIsp.
RESOL. MAG., 3:2 1996, at 16, 16; see also Deborah Hensler, In Search of "Good"
Mediation: Rhetoric, Practice, & Empiricism, in JUSTICE & SocIETY (Joseph Sanders
ed., forthcoming 2000).
160 See William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming .... 15 L. & Soc'yREv. 631, 636-37 (1981).
161 William L.F. Felstiner, Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9
L. & Soc'y REv. 695, 704 (1975); William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social
Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 63, 71 (1974).
162 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in
Search of a Theory, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., 1983, at 905, 925-28 (discussing
contextual factors in evaluating disputing processes). I was once a civil rights and
poverty lawyer.
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mandatory court programs)-we now need to know more about what
patterns of disputing are like in those settings.
We have little empirical verification of the claims made both for and
against arbitration and ADR, including positive assertions made about
reduced cost, speed, and access to dispute mechanisms, as we really do not
have much data about whether one-shotters always do worse in
institutionally established ADR, although the Bingham 163 and Engalla data
do demonstrate some clear areas for concern. 164
More problematically, we know even less about a wide variety of
private uses of ADR, both within organizations ("internal dispute
resolution" as Edelman and Suchman label it165) and in the millions of
private disputes that use some form of ADR, with or without contracts.
Even the major providers of ADR services, like JAMS-Endispute and
others, have been resistant to external study. 166 We are beginning to see
some important studies of micro-behavior within some private forms of
ADR, like mediation, which demonstrate some concerns about other kinds
163 See Bingham, supra note 106, at 113-16.
164 For some of the more qualitative reports of difficulties for disempowered
classes in mediation, see generally Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991), and Richard Delgado et al., Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1391-1400. But see MICHELLE HERMANN ET AL., THE
METROCOURT PRoJEcT FINAL REPORT: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF ETHNICrrY AND
GENDER IN MEDIATED AND ADJUDICATED SMALL CLAIM CASES AT THE METROPOLITAN
COURT MEDIATION CENTER 115-17, 129-34, 137-48 (1993); Gary LaFree & Christine
Rack, The Effect of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in
Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & Soc'Y REv. 767, 788-93 (1996)
(demonstrating that relationship of race and gender to mediation and litigated outcomes
is more complex).
165 Edelman & Suchman, supra note 120.
166 1 served as an advisor to an Institute for Social Analysis study, funded by the
State Justice Institute, of private "rent-a-judge" proceedings in California, and JAMS-
Endispute refused to release important "proprietary" data about such things as their
"important" caseloads and fees paid to arbitrators, among others. For a final report,
see generally JANICE ROEHL ET AL., PRIVATE JUDGING: A STUDY OF ITS VOLUME,
NATURE, AND IMPACT ON STATE COURTS (1993), and for the difficulty of studying
private dispute resolution, see Janice A. Roehl, Private Dispute Resolution, in COURT-
CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH: A REPORT ON CURRENT RESEARCH
FINDINGS- IMPLICATIONS FOR COURT AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS, supra note 154,
at 331, 131, 143, 151.
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of "power imbalances" within ADR, including linguistic, 167 race, class,
and gender168 endowments, that may empower some other forms of
"Haves" over "Have-nots," but this research has just begun and often
suggests more questions than it provides clear answers.
So, what do we need to know? Studies like Lisa Bingham's in the
employment arbitration context and Eisenberg and Clermont's in the
litigation context are rigorous attempts to assess patterns of outcomes in
relation to particular processes. Do claimants do better or worse (as a
percentage of what they demand) in arbitration or mediation 169 than in
other fora? Do they claim more often? Less often? Does it make a
difference if they are represented or not? By a lawyer or nonlawyer?170
How do we measure outcomes if nonmonetary solutions (like job transfers,
promotions, new or exchanged products) are achieved?171 Do different
processes have varying impacts on outcomes? Do repeat players have the
same advantages in mediation as they might have in arbitration? What is
gained by the use of particular processes? For example, the repeat player
mediator or arbitrator who is expert in a particular field (like discrimination
law) actually may provide not only "better" quality resolutions, but more
efficient and claimant sensitive services. 172 These measurement questions
167 See JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM O'BARR, JUST WoRDs: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND
POWER 39-59 (1998); see generally David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall,
Argumentative Talk in Divorce Mediation Sessions, 62 AM. Soc. REv. 151 (1997);
David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary
Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 L. & Soc'y REv. 613
(1989).
168 See HERMANN ET AL., supra note 164, at 89-90; Isabelle R. Gunning,
Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. Disp. RES.
55, 58-68.
169 See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in
Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 254 (1981); Neil Vidmar, The
Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical Investigation,
18 L. & Soc'y REv. 515, 526-27 (1984).
17 0 See HERBERT M. KRTzER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS
AT WORK 1-22 (1998).
171 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Negotiation, 21 L. & Soc'y
REv. 341, 346-47 (1987) (suggesting that as long as attorney's fees are monetized and
contingent on monetary amounts, there will be a limit to the kinds of creative solutions
that might be developed by lawyer representatives).
172 Some ADR firms are being established that specialize in particular disputes,
such as employment (Wittenberg, Shaw in New York), intellectual property, insurance,
and construction (Bickerman and Associates). I believe that my "expertise" in Dalkon
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are not new, but remain problematic for operationalization of studies about
ADR.173
What are the "newer" problems associated with repeat play providers?
Conflicts of interests, monopolization of services, quality control, barriers
to entry in the field? Privatization and accountability? 174
V. IF THE "HAVES" COME OUT AHEAD-WHAT Do WE Do?
In the spirit of celebrating Marc Galanter's important achievement, it
seems only appropriate to end with some speculations for reform, posited
on the yet-to-be-totally-proven notion that the "'Haves' Come out Ahead"
in ADR, as they do wherever there are "Haves" and "Have-nots." As
Richard Speidel and others have suggested, statutory reform may be in
order. If the courts continue to treat one-shotters as if they have willingly
contracted for private dispute resolution, then statutory changes to the FAA
providing some of the protections of the Due Process Protocol may be in
order (representation, discovery, written opinions, and some judicial review
are often suggested). Current efforts to "regulate" by private associations
include the Consumer Bill of Rights for Arbitration 175 and the CPR-
Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, 176 both of
which are seeking voluntary disclosure requirements and compliance with
basic procedural rights. Some particular forms of disputing could be
prohibited absolutely (e.g., certain conflicts of interest, lack of consent,
discovery) or at least be disapproved of by the courts (as occurred in
Shield arbitrations allowed me to be both more sensitive to claimant's needs and more
efficient at the same time. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82, at 531-34.
173 See Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and
Outcomes: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENy. U. L. REv. 419, 436
(1989); see also John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do Not Know
What We Think and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66 DENy. U. L. REv. 499,
542-43 (1989).
174 See generally Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra
note 59; see also YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN ViRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 18 (1996).
175 See AmmICAN ARBrRATION Assoc., CONSUMER DuE PROCESS PROTOCOL: A
DuE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES
1-4 (1998).
176 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.5.3(b)(1) (CPR-
Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Proposed Draft 1999),
reprinted in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71.
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Engalla177). Evaluation studies and exit polls of users might demonstrate
more accurately what works, what does not, and why.
As the procedural justice literature has told us, parties may be content
with an ability to be heard by a third person neutral if they are convinced
the process is otherwise fair. 178 If representation matters, as we all suspect
it does, must it always be a lawyer who assists one-shotters? Can
consumers, employees, clients, investors, and others with disputes help
each other gain repeat play advantage by collectivizing either their claims
or their representational efforts? What efforts need to be made to publicize
results and monitor patterns of claiming in order to educate both broader
constituencies, as well as the institutions and users of a dispute resolution
system, about what disputes are about, and what needs to be fixed or
changed? Judge Jack Weinstein, among others, has suggested that modern
disputing requires collectivization, through communitarian values, on the
part of co-disputants, coupled with modern technological innovation, to
improve communication between parties and among claimants, including
video-taped information about cases and support group call-in lines for
information and advice, as has been utilized in some modern mass torts. 179
The Internet presents an opportunity for new forms of claimant information
and collective action.1s0
In short, we think we know that the "'Haves' Come out Ahead" in
ADR, as they do in litigation, but they may come out ahead in different
ways or for different reasons. Therefore, as socio-legal scholars who have
much to thank Marc Galanter for, it behooves the legal and social
empiricists and reformers among us to collect the data we need so we can
be more certain that the solutions we suggest will solve the problems that
actually exist and not the ones we simply think exist. If the "'Haves' Come
out Ahead" in both litigation and ADR, then where will we go next to
achieve social justice in disputing?
177 See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 916-17 (Cal.
1997).
178 See generally TOM R. TYLER & E. ALLAN LIND, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); see also Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power in Civil
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